A system with multiple interacting agents (whether arti cial or human) is often best analyzed using game-theoretic tools. Unfortunately, while the formal foundations are well-established, standard computational techniques for game-theoretic reasoning are inadequate for dealing with realistic games. This paper describes the Gala system, an implemented system that allows the speci cation and e cient solution of large imperfect information games. The system contains the rst implementation of a recent algorithm, due to Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel. Experimental results from the system demonstrate that the algorithm is exponentially faster than the standard algorithm in practice, not just in theory. It therefore allows the solution of games that are orders of magnitude larger than were previously possible. The system also provides a new declarative language for compactly and naturally representing games by their rules. As a whole, the Gala system provides the capability for automated game-theoretic analysis of complex real-world situations.
Introduction
When designing or analyzing a situation with multiple interacting entities, it is important to consider the (often incompatible) goals of these entities, their possible actions, and the information available to them. Game theory provides us with the tools to formally model such a situation as a multi-player game, to analyze it, and to prescribe`rational' strategies to the di erent players.
Since real life contains many situations involving multiple interactive agents with incompatible goals, game theory has played a role in a variety of di erent areas. Game theory has been fundamental in economics Aumann and Hart, 1992] , both in the theoretical foundations of microeconomic theory and in more practical examples (such as the design of the 1995/6 FCC auction of wavelengths Norton, 1995] ). Game theory has also been applied in the realm of government policy, law, politics, military analysis (both strategic and tactical), biology, and more.
Clearly, situations involving multiple agents also arise in computer science applications. In some applications, the agents are a mixture of computer and human users, e.g., computer game playing, interface design, or discourse understanding. Other applications involve two or more arti cial agents, e.g., network routing, load sharing and resource allocation in a distributed system, coordination of multiple robots, and information or service transactions on the internet.
The applicability of game-theoretic analysis to computer science problems has not gone unnoticed. In recent years, several such problems have been analyzed using game theoretic tools, with interesting results. Examples include the work of Franklin, Galil, and Yung 1993] on computer security, the work of Shenker 1995] on network routing protocols, and the work of Parikh 1992] on discourse understanding. In arti cial intelligence, more and more researchers are turning to game theory for the theoretical foundations of multi-agent systems (see, for example, Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994] and the references therein).
Despite the growing popularity of game theory as an analytic tool, there has been little work on providing e ective automated tools for game-theoretic analysis. The work in this area has focused almost exclusively on solution algorithms for games of perfect information: games where all players have full knowledge of the current state of the world. Unfortunately, such games form a very small fraction of the class of games that concern game theory. In real life, almost all situations contain some aspects that are hidden from the players.
It is important to distinguish the lack of information from the possibility of chance moves. The former involves uncertainty about the current state of the world, particulary situations where di erent players have access to di erent information. The latter involves only uncertainty about the future, uncertainty which is resolved as soon as the future materializes. Both perfect and imperfect information games may involve an element of chance; examples of games from all four categories are shown in Figure 1 . Most of these are popular recreational games. The inspection game is used by game theorists to model arms control inspections; it is described in Section 3.5. The OPEC game models oil pricing by oil-producing countries; it is described in Rasmusen's game theory textbook 1989].
Perfect information Imperfect information No chance
Chess Go Inspection game Battleships Chance Backgammon Monopoly OPEC game Poker Figure 1 : Examples of games of various types.
As it turns out, the presence of chance elements does not necessitate major changes to the computational techniques used to solve a game. In fact, the cost of solving a perfect information game with chance moves is not substantially greater than solving a game with no chance moves. By contrast, the introduction of imperfect information greatly increases the complexity of the problem. This increase materializes even in the one player case, 1 and is even more of a problem in the multiplayer case, particularly when the di erent players may have access to di erent information.
Due to the complexity (both conceptual and algorithmic) of dealing with imperfect information games, this problem has been largely ignored at the computational level. The lack of a computational infrastructure for dealing with such games has had several unfortunate consequences:
Since game-theoretic analysis must be done manually, only small simple games can be analyzed. When faced with a more complex situation (as most real-life situations are), the decision-maker must abstract the situation and simplify it until it becomes amenable to manual analysis. As a consequence, the results of the analysis, while providing insight, can rarely be applied directly to the original problem.
Manual game-theoretic analysis is a subtle and complicated task, which can only be performed 1 The problem of solving a Markov decision process (MDP) is much easier than the problem of solving a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). See Kaelbling et al., 1996] for a survey.
by experts. Therefore, the tools provided by game theory are only available to the general public via specialized consultants. The lack of practical game-theoretic algorithms has prevented the use of game-theoretic decision making directly by autonomous arti cial agents. In this paper, we take a rst step towards addressing this lack. We describe an implemented system, called Gala, which automates game-theoretic analysis for a large class of games. The system takes a description of a game, analyzes it, and outputs strategies for the di erent players which are game-theoretically rational for the situation described. If desired, the system can also simulate the game (playing the role of one or more of the agents), providing a picture of the di erent scenarios that are likely to arise.
The Gala system is composed of two main interacting pieces. The rst allows large complex games to be described clearly and concisely, using a special-purpose game speci cation language, which we also call Gala. The Gala language mimics the way in which a large game is typically described in natural language, by presenting its rules. For example, Figure 2 presents part of a Gala speci cation for the game of Poker.
Given a game speci cation such as this, the rst component of the Gala system generates the extensive form of a game, a natural augmentation of a game tree utilized by game theorists. \Standard" game trees, as typically used in AI game-playing systems, are inadequate for modelling real-life games, since they do not represent the agents' information state. The extensive form addresses this problem by augmenting game trees with information sets.
The second main component of the Gala system automatically analyzes and nds optimal strategies for games in extensive form. For games of imperfect information, the use of randomized strategies is essential in order to achieve guaranteed reasonable performance. The basic insight is that deterministic strategies can be predictable, allowing the opponent(s) to gain additional information about the state of the game.
Once randomized strategies are allowed, the existence of \optimal strategies" in imperfect information games can be proved Nash, 1951] . In particular, this means that there exists an optimal randomized strategy for poker, in much the same way as there exists an optimal deterministic strategy for chess. Indeed, Kuhn 1950] has shown for a simpli ed poker game that the optimal strategy does, indeed, use randomization.
The optimal strategy has several advantages: the player cannot do better than this strategy if playing against a good opponent, and furthermore the player does not do worse even if his strategy is revealed to his opponent, i.e., the opponent gains no advantage from guring out the player's strategy. This last feature is particularly important in the context of automated game-analysis programs, since they are often vulnerable to this form of attack: sometimes the code is accessible, and in general, since they always play the same way, their strategy can be discovered by intensive testing. Given these important bene ts of randomized strategies in imperfect information games, it is somewhat surprising that none of the (very few) AI papers that deal with these games (e.g., Blair et al., 1993; Gordon, 1993; Smith and Nau, 1993] ) utilize such strategies.
Clearly, none of the minimax-based solution algorithms used for nding optimal strategies in standard game trees can be adapted to the task of nding randomized strategies in imperfect information games. The Gala system provides access to a variety of solution algorithms for imperfect information games.
Game-theoretic solution algorithms can be partitioned into two classes, based on the game representation they use. Traditionally, games in extensive form have been solved by converting them to an alternative representation, called the normal form. Standard linear optimization routines such (money($player) gets $cash, %% each player gets his/her initial allocation of cash pay($ante, $player, pot)), %% and pays the ante into the pot deal: (choose(nature, (Hand1, Hand2), (deal(deck, $cards, Hand1), deal(deck, $cards, Hand2))), %% a pair of random hands is chosen and dealt from the deck reveal(gambler, myhand(Hand1)), reveal(dealer, myhand(Hand2)), %% each player's hand is revealed only to him if(beats(Hand1, Hand2), betterhand gets gambler, betterhand gets dealer)), %% evaluate the hands immediately, so that we only do %% it once per deal, rather than at every possible showdown bet:
(choose(gambler, InitialBet, between(0, $money(gambler), InitialBet)), %% the player chooses his bet reveal(dealer, bet(gambler, InitialBet)), %% reveals it to the other player debt := InitialBet, pay (InitialBet, gambler, pot) , %% and pays it into the pot take_turns(next_bet)), next_bet: (choose($player, Bet, ( % meet or raise between($debt, $money($player), Bet) ; % fold ($debt>0, Bet = 0))), if(($debt>0, Bet = 0), wins($opponent), % fold (pay(Bet, $player, pot), % meet or raise if ($debt=0, wins($betterhand), % showdown (reveal($opponent, bet($player, Bet)), debt gets Bet -$debt))))), ... as linear programming and linear complementarity can then be used for nding optimal strategies. Gala provides access to these normal-form solution algorithms by interfacing with a state-of-the-art game-theoretic solving system called gambit McKelvey, 1992] .
Unfortunately, the normal-form conversion process incurs exponential blowup in the size of the representation, rendering this approach impractical for large games. Gala therefore implements an alternative approach, due to Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel 1994] , for solving games in extensive form. The approach is based on converting the game to a di erent representation, called the sequence form. This representation is much more compact than the normal form, but supports the use of similar linear optimization algorithms. The result is solution algorithms that are exponentially faster than the normal-form based algorithms.
One of the sequence-form algorithms is implemented as part of the Gala system (others will be added in future versions of the system). We provide the rst experimental results for this algorithm, comparing it to the standard algorithm (based on the normal form). Our results show that this algorithm is exponentially faster not only in theory, but also in practice. It allows us to optimally solve complex games where the tree has tens of thousands of nodes. In comparison, normal-form algorithms can rarely deal with game trees larger than 30 nodes.
By combining the ability to easily specify complex games with the algorithms capable of solving them, the Gala system provides a complete automated game-theoretic analysis tool. For example, from a Gala speci cation of a Poker game, as in Figure 2 , the system would generate a game tree, which would then be analyzed to produce optimal strategies for Poker. To illustrate this process, consider an instantiation of a general poker game to the case where the deck consists of 8 cards (6{K), each player gets one card, and each player only has one dollar to bet. Such a game would consist of three rounds. In the rst round, the gambler can either bet his dollar or pass. After hearing the gambler's bet, the dealer must decide whether to bet or pass. If the gambler passed and the dealer decides to bet, the gambler still has his dollar, and therefore gets one more opportunity to decide whether or not to bet. At that point, the game ends. The optimal strategies for the gambler in this game, as obtained for the Gala system, are shown in Figure 3 . They demonstrate an interesting phenomenon ( rst observed in a simpler game by Kuhn 1950] ): Behaviors such as blu ng, that seem to arise from the psychological makeup of human players, are actually game-theoretically optimal.
These strategies were generated completely automatically by the Gala system, starting from the description of the rules of Poker, described in Figure 2 . Thus, the system provides complete end-to-end functionality, where we start from a simple speci cation of the rules of a game, and end up with a clear and comprehensible description of optimal strategies for that game.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the extensive form of a game, where game trees are augmented with information sets. In Section 3, we describe the Gala language, which supports a clear and concise speci cation of large and complex games by allowing a formal speci cation of the rules of a game. In Section 4, we review the basic solution concepts in imperfect information games, including the de nition of the Nash equilibrium Nash, 1951] . In Section 5 we survey both the standard game-theoretic solution algorithms based on the normal form of the game, as well as the more recent sequence form algorithms of Koller et al., 1994] . In Section 6, we show how these di erent ideas come together to form the Gala system, and present the rst experimental results comparing the sequence form and the normal form algorithms. We conclude in Section 7 with some discussion and directions for future work. As some readers may be unfamiliar with game-theoretic concepts and techniques, the paper contains some tutorial sections that review well-known material. Section 2, Section 4 and Section 5.1 present standard concepts from game theory, while Section 5.2 reviews more recent work.
The extensive form
In this section we review the extensive form representation of a game. Readers familiar with game theory may wish to skip this section or to skim it rapidly so as to familiarize themselves with the notation used later on. The extensive form is similar to the traditional AI representation of a game as a tree. As usual, each node represents a possible state at some point in time, with the root representing the initial state. Each edge is an action which changes the state into a new one. In this paper, we restrict attention to situations that have a nite action set and end after a nite number of actions have been taken. Therefore, we consider only nite trees.
When modeling a multi-agent situation, each node is associated with a single agent, whose turn it is to choose an action. The set of edges leading out of a node are the choices available to that agent. The agent acting at a given node may also be chance or nature, in which case the edges represent random events. An agent's strategy dictates its moves at the di erent points in the game. In order to recommend a strategy which is rational for an agent, we must model the agent's preferences over the di erent possible outcomes of the situation. Therefore, we associate a vector of payo s, one for each agent, with each leaf of the tree.
This representation of a multi-agent situation is the very familiar one, standardly used to represent game trees in AI game-playing applications. Unfortunately, it is inadequate as a model for some games, and for almost all games that model real-world situations. To understand why, consider the following simpli ed variant of poker, rst described by Kuhn 1950] . The game has two players, each of whom initially has two dollars, and a deck containing the three cards J, Q, and K. Each player antes one dollar and is dealt one card. Figure 4 shows half of the game tree for this game: the part of the tree corresponding to the deals (Q; J), (Q; K), and (J; K). The game consists of three rounds. In the rst round, the gambler (shown in grey) can either bet an additional dollar or pass. After hearing the gambler's bet, the dealer (shown in dashed black) decides whether to bet or pass. If the gambler passed and the dealer decides to bet, the gambler still has a dollar, and therefore gets one more opportunity to decide whether or not to bet. At that point, the game ends. If both bet or both pass, the player with the highest card takes the pot; in the rst case, the winning player wins two dollars, and in the second case, he or she wins one. If one player bet and the other passed, then the betting player takes the pot, thereby winning one dollar.
At rst glance, Figure 4 appears to be an adequate, albeit partial, representation of this game.
However, this is not the case. Note that, at the two points corresponding to the deals (Q; J) and (Q; K), the gambler has exactly the same information. So, even if the gambler would prefer to bet in the rst case and pass in the second, this is not a strategy that he is capable of executing. Unfortunately, this information about the gambler's information state is encoded nowhere in this Figure 4 : Naive attempt at a partial game tree for simpli ed poker, containing three of the six possible deals.
tree. Therefore, an algorithm that uses this tree as a model of the game cannot possibly determine that this \omniscient" strategy is not legitimate. Figure 5: A partial game tree for simpli ed poker, containing three of the six possible deals. A move to the left corresponds to a pass, a move to the right to a bet. The information sets are drawn as ellipses; some of them extend into other parts of the tree.
Game theorists have long known that the representation of a game must encode the information states of the players. Therefore, the standard representation of a game as a tree, known as the extensive form of the game, also contains information sets. Each information set, represented graphically by an oval containing several nodes of the tree, aggregates those states of the game which are indistinguishable to the player whose turn it is to act. For example, as shown in Figure 5 , the two nodes immediately following the deals (Q; J) and (Q; K) are in a single information set, which is associated with the gambler.
More precisely, let (c; d) denote the hands dealt to the two players. Initially, the gambler only knows his own card, so for each possible c, he has one information set u c containing two nodes; each node corresponds to the two possibilities for the dealer's hand. In her turn, the dealer knows d as well as the gambler's action in the rst round. Hence, she has two information sets for each d|v p d and v b d |corresponding to the gambler's previous action. Finally, the gambler has an information set u 0 c in the third round. As we can see, Figure 5 is an accurate (although still partial) representation of this game.
We can now provide a formal de nition of an extensive form game, as rst described by Kuhn 1953] . The game is represented as a nite directed tree whose nodes denote game states.
The internal nodes of the tree are of two types: decision nodes of some player k, for k = 1; : : :; n, and chance moves. The outgoing edges at a decision node represent possible actions at that node, and have distinct labels called choices. A play denotes the path from the root to some leaf. A move is a choice taken on that path.
The payo function h determines a payo vector h(p) 2 IR n for each leaf p. The kth component h k (p) of h(p) is the payo at p to player k. The relation between the payo s to the di erent players is, in general, arbitrary. Thus, the interests of the players may coincide in some circumstances, and con ict in others. A zero-sum game models a situation where there are only two players, whose interests are strictly opposed, i.e., h 2 = ?h 1 .
The set of decision nodes is partitioned into information sets. Each information set u belongs to exactly one player k. Intuitively, the player cannot di erentiate between di erent nodes in the same information set. This implies that at each node p in u, the player must have the same set C u of choices (labels for the outgoing edges) at u. For simplicity, it is assumed that the choice sets C u and C v of any two information sets u and v are disjoint. For example, in Figure 5 Throughout this paper, we restrict attention, as in most of the game-theory literature, to games where all of the players have perfect recall. Informally, a player has perfect recall if she never forgets her previous actions or any fact that she knows. Formally:
De nition 2.1: Player k is said to have perfect recall if for each of her information sets u, and any two nodes p; q 2 u, the sequence of player k choices on the path to p is precisely the same as the sequence of player k choices on the path to q. Thus, p and q can only be in the same information set if the entire history of events leading to u and v is identical according to player k's point of view. Had there been some di erence between the two histories, player k would have had to forget that di erence in order to place p and q in the same information set. Recall that we assumed that actions at di erent information sets have di erent labels. For example, the rst-round passing action when the gambler has a Queen would be labelled p Q , while the same action when the gambler has a Jack would be labelled p J . Thus, two histories that pass through di erent information sets must be di erent. Hence, the de nition of perfect recall guarantees that two histories that passed through di erent information sets can never \converge" into the same information set; i.e., the player can never \forget" information she once had.
The Gala language
The extensive form captures the low-level dynamics of the game: the choice points, the choices available, and the sets of nodes among which a player cannot distinguish. However, it captures none of the underlying structure, e.g., the fact that the choices of a Poker player are determined by by the amount of money he has left. In fact, within the extensive form, we cannot even represent the amount of money the player has at various points in the game.
Since we cannot encode this information, we cannot utilize it to compactly specify the game tree (e.g., by observing that the available moves in the betting round of Poker are identical regardless of the hands the players are dealt). The game tree must be written down explicitly: every move and every information set. While it is possible, although far from trivial, to write down a correct game tree with 30 nodes, it is unrealistic to expect a person to manually construct a game tree with thousands of nodes. It is even less reasonable to expect the resulting game tree to be correct.
In this section, we present a language, called Gala (for GAme LAnguage), 2 that supports clear and concise speci cations of large, complex games. Gala mimics the way in which a large game is typically described in natural language, by presenting its rules.
The idea of using a declarative language to specify games was proposed by Pell 1992] . He utilizes it to specify symmetric chess-like games|a class of two-player perfect-information board games. Our language is much more general, and can be used to represent a very wide class of games, in particular: one-player, two-player and multi-player games; games where the outcomes are arbitrary payo s; and games with either perfect or imperfect information. As we will show, the expressive power of Gala allows for clear and concise game descriptions, that resemble, at a high-level, a natural language representation of the rules of the game.
Gala describes a game as a branching program, where each possible execution of the program corresponds to a possible play of the game, as determined by the players' actions and by the outcomes of the chance moves. The program rst speci es an initial state, including the number of players. It then lists a sequence of game steps, whose execution causes the game state and the players' information state to change over the course of the game.
A Gala program consists of a set of declarations. These declarations fall into two categories. Declarations in the rst category describe entities in the game. In a poker program they might say that the game involves two players named dealer and gambler, a deck of cards, and so on. The other category contains declarations that describe the sequence of events that take place during the game. In Figure 2 , the declarations for flow, ante, deal, bet and next bet all fall into this category. Each such declaration contains a sequence of Gala statements. Gala provides ow control statements similar to those found in many programming languages.
Three important Gala statements are choose, reveal and outcome. These are the basic building blocks for de ning the course of a game. A choose statement de nes a choice point in the game; it indicates the set of choices available at that point, and whether the choice is made by a player or at random. A reveal statement changes the information state of a player. The payoff statements determine the nal outcome of the game.
In addition, Gala allows a game state to be explicitly speci ed, maintained through the game, and utilized in determining the available choices. For example, in the Poker program of Figure 2 , we maintain the amount of money available to the players via the variables $money(gambler) and $money(dealer). These are updated by Gala commands as the betting progresses, and are accessed to determine the set of possible amounts that a player can choose to bet.
The game manipulation statements range from simple variable manipulation, to ubiquitous concepts such as combinations of objects, to special-purpose libraries for dealing with certain types of objects (e.g., a rectilinear board). These statements do not directly a ect the structure of the game; they do not induce choice points or specify information sets. Rather, they provide bookkeeping for the game state, which in turns supports the speci cation of the game tree. 2 We use the name \Gala" to refer both to the Gala language and to the Gala system described in Section 6, which contains an implementation of the Gala language and algorithms for solving games speci ed in this language.
It is worth discussing the relationship between Gala and Prolog. Gala is embedded in Prolog, and uses Prolog syntax for many of its constructs. The Gala interpreter is written in Prolog, and uses the Prolog proof generator to discover all possible plays of a game. In addition, Prolog predicates can be called from within a Gala program, allowing conditions on the game state to be expressed as declarative queries. We do require that Prolog predicates called from within Gala be deterministic, so that all non-determinism in the game is de ned by choose statements. In general, the code describing a game in Gala consists of two parts: the Gala program itself, and auxiliary Prolog predicates used by the Gala program.
We begin by discussing the underlying semantics of a Gala program. We then discuss the various types of Gala statements: basic primitives, ow control, and game state manipulation. Finally, we demonstrate how the various features of the language come together in specifying complete games.
Gala semantics
As we have discussed, game trees are not su ciently expressive for ascribing precise semantics to a Gala program, since they do not allow us to discuss the state of the game and the information state of the players. We therefore consider a somewhat more expressive framework, based on the work of Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi 1995] for reasoning about multi-agent systems.
We specify the behavior of a Gala program via its execution tree. Each node in the execution tree is a possible state that can occur in the game, with the root corresponding to the initial state of the program, and the children of each node corresponding to those states that can follow the state encoded by that node.
As The execution tree is a directed tree whose vertices are labeled with global states. The successors of a state are the possible states resulting from executing the rst command in the game ow at that state. Some transitions are deterministic, corresponding to the mechanics of the game (e.g., transferring the ante to the pot in the beginning of a poker game). In this case, the vertex will have only a single successor. In other cases, the transition corresponds to a choice point in the game, resulting in vertices with several successors. The choice point can be due either to a chance event (e.g., a roll of the dice) or to an action of one of the players (e.g., a decision to pass or bet). Di erent choices of action will induce di erent possible plays of the game.
Basic Gala

Choice points
The choose statement has the format choose(Player, Template, Constraint), where Template is a Prolog expression containing unbound variables, and Constraint is a Prolog predicate. Any instantiation of Template satisfying Constraint is an action that can be taken in the current state. 3 For example, the choose(gambler, InitialBet, between(0, $money(gambler), Bet)) statement in Figure 2 speci es the set of possible actions to be any numerical value for the variable Bet which is between 0 and the amount of money that the gambler has. (See the semantics of Gala variables in Section 3.3.1.) Player is either the name of a player, or nature( ), where is a probability distribution over the instantiations of Template satisfying Constraint. 4 The power of choose lies in the fact that the available actions in a state are the answers to a query, and do not have to be encoded explicitly. The answers to the query depend on the current game state, and vary according to context. For example, the available bets in the statement above depend on the current value of the variable $money(gambler), as described in the gamestate part of the global state. Thus, the same choose statement can be used throughout the betting phase.
More formally, let h(\choose(Player,Template,Constraint), "; V); F 1 ; : : :; F k ; : : :; F N i; be the current state, and let I be the set of instantiations of Template that satisfy the prolog constraint Constraint and are consistent with V. For each I 2 I, let V=I denote the re nement of the bindings of Prolog variables in V by the bindings in I.
We cannot transition directly from this state to the state after the choice is made, since, at this point, the player might not know the set of actions available to her. (The information may not be in her local state.) We therefore implement the statement using two transitions. Formally, when the interpretation of Player is some player k 2 f1; : : :; Ng, then a deterministic transition is made to the state: h(\choosing(k, I), "; V); F 1 ; : : :; (F k choosing(I)); : : :; F N i :
The statement choosing is not a statement in the Gala language; it is just a placeholder for the intermediate state. Note that the addition of the fact choosing(I) to F k forces the player to distinguish between states where she had di erent choice sets.
This new state has multiple successor states, corresponding to all possible instantiations I 2 I.
Each such state has the form h(\ "; V=I); F 1 ; : : :; (F k choosing(I) chose(I)); : : :; F n i ; where V=I is the modi cation of V according to the bindings in I. (See the speci cation of variables below.) Note that the fact chose(I) is added to the player's local state, enforcing the requirement (implied by the perfect recall assumption) that a player always remembers her own actions.
For the case of chance events, where Player is nature( ), then we rst transition to the state h(\choosing(nature( ), I), "; V); F 1 ; : : :; F N i : 3 We assume that in a correct Gala program, this set of instantiations is nite and will be computed in Prolog in a nite amount of time.
The set of successors for this state are all those of the form h(\ "; V=I);F 1 ; : : :; F n i ; such that I 2 I. Each of these successor states is reached with probability (I).
The choose statement is the only way to represent choice points in the game, whether the choice is due to a chance move or to a move by one of the players. Thus, it is the only statement to allow multiple successor states in the execution tree.
Information states
The reveal statement has the format reveal(Player, Fact), where Player is any player and Fact is any Prolog term. Intuitively, the fact Fact is added to the player's local state, allowing the player to distinguish runs where Fact was observed from runs where it was not. Fact is interpreted by the Prolog system, using the set of bindings in V.
More formally, let h(\reveal(Player,Fact), "; V); F 1 ; : : :; F k ; : : :; F N i; be the current state, and let k be the interpretation of Player. Then the next state is:
h(\ "; V); F 1 ; : : :; F k Fact V ; : : :; F N i: where Fact V is the Prolog term resulting from interpreting Fact using the bindings in V. 5 For example, in the Gala program of Figure Note that the facts known by a player are ordered, so a player can di erentiate between runs in which the same facts were revealed in di erent orders. This is important, because perfect recall (see De nition 2.1) requires that a player distinguish between runs in which a fact was revealed before or after choosing an action. We ful l this requirement by adding chose(Action) to the list of facts known to the player at the time the action is chosen. Since choose and reveal are the only Gala statements that change a player's local state, and they always append information to the facts already known, perfect recall is maintained.
Payo s
The format of the payoff statement is payoff(Player, Amount). It is interpreted to mean that the amount Amount is added to Player's payo to date. Thus, the player's actual payo at the end of the game is the amount she has accumulated throughout the game. The cumulative nature of the payoff command allows it to be used in contexts where the game may be very long or in nite. In such games, we often want to consider a pre x of the game, and it is useful to be able to have a record of the player's payo s to date. Note that we do not assume that the payo is revealed to the player.
Basic ow control
Gala provides several ow control statements that can be used to guide the progress of the game. The most basic ones are concatenation, termination and conditional statements.
Concatenation is straightforward. If ' and are game ows, then ('; ) is simply the concatenation of the steps in ' and . The semantics for concatenation is derived from the semantics for other statements, as demonstrated above.
The game terminates whenever the game ow in a state is empty, or an end statement is reached.
The payo h k accumulated up to that point is then allocated to player k. Figure 8 ) used in the argument of an if statement. The outcome of this predicate thereby determines the assignment to the variable betterhand.
Game trees
These primitives are the basic tools for specifying game trees within the Gala language. Any extensive form game can be written as a Gala program utilizing only the features described above. A leaf can be translated into an outcome statement with an appropriate vector of payo s. For an internal node p, suppose player k has to choose one of the actions c 1 ; : : :; c`, and that p is in information set u. Assume (by induction) that we have already de ned game ows 1 ; : : :; `f or the subtrees rooted at the correspoding children of p. Then the subtree rooted at p can be translated `?1 , `) )) . Conversely, the basic primitives choose, reveal, and payoff are the only Gala commands that directly in uence the construction of the game tree from a Gala program. We will discuss this further at the end of this section.
Maintaining game state
As we mentioned, the power of the choose statement derives from the fact that the player's set of choices does not have to be explicitly listed in the program. Rather, this set can depend on the current state of the game. Gala provides an extensive suite of commands for accessing and manipulating the game state.
Variables
As in a traditional programming language, the state is maintained via a set of variables. Some of these are standard Prolog variables, which can be accessed in any of the statements described above. The bindings for the Prolog variables are maintained as part of the set of bindings V. They can be changed as a consequences of some of the statements described above (e.g., as a consequence of a particular choice in a choose statement).
It is often convenient to model the changing game state in the same way as the changing state of traditional programming languages, using variables whose values can be assigned and changed at will. For this reason, it helps to provide Gala variables in addition to the Prolog variables. Gala variables are similar to variables encountered in many programming languages: they can be assigned values at will, without requiring (as for Prolog variables) that the new value be consistent with the old value.
The two types of variables are normally used in di erent ways. Prolog variables are useful for storing local information and connecting statements within a game ow, while Gala variables can maintain global information that is used throughout the course of the game. For example, consider the following code fragment: This fragment speci es that player a chooses any number between 1 and 10 and reveals only its parity to player b. Player b then tries to guess the number, and gets the number's value added to his score if he guesses right. The Prolog variables Number, Parity and Guess are used to connect the statements together and relate the numbers to each other. The Gala variable score, in contrast, maintains the score that is accumulated throughout the course of the game.
Gala variables can be directly referenced within a game ow by putting a \$" in front of them. They can be instantiated within a game ow using the gala command gets, which is analogous to is in Prolog. Gala variables can be converted to and from Prolog variables using gala val(GalaVar, PrologVar), and gala set(GalaVar, Value). These statements allow Prolog predicates outside the Gala program to access and modify the game state. The semantics for setting and referencing Gala variables are obvious: setting a variable causes a transition to a state in which the new binding is appended to the list, and a reference to a variable is replaced by the value in its most recent binding.
In Figure 2 , the only Prolog variables are Hand1 , Hand2, and Bet. They serve precisely the role described above, of making a short-term connection between the outcome of the choose statement with some additional statements. For example, we use Bet in the statement revealing information to the opponent, and also to update the value of debt. The use of the Gala variable debt allows information to be passed between di erent calls to next bet.
More complex game states
The di erent types of variables provide the basic facilities for storing, manipulating, and accessing various aspects of the game state. Using variables, Gala provides a shorthand notation for concepts that occur ubiquitously in games. These include locations and their contents, pieces and their movement patterns, and resources that change hands, such as money. For example, Gala allows the user to utilize statements of the form move(queen(white), (d,1), (d,8)) or pay(gambler, pot, Bet).
On a more abstract level, we have observed that certain structures and combinations appear in many di erent games. While these usually involve sets in one way or another, they come in many avors. For example, a ush in poker is a set of ve cards sharing a common property; a straight, on the other hand, is a sequence of cards in which successive elements bear a relation to one another; a full house is a partition into equivalence classes based on rank in which the classes are of a speci c size.
The Prolog language provides a few predicates that describe sets and subsets. We have supplemented these with various predicates that make it easy to describe many of the combinations occuring in games. For example, chain(Predicate, Set) determines whether Set is a sequence of objects in which successive elements are related by Predicate, while partition(Relation, Set, Classes) partitions Set into equivalence Classes de ned by the equivalence relation Relation.
The following example, using a more elaborate function provided in the same library, shows how we can concisely test for all types of poker hand except ushes and straights: The predicate partition profile takes three arguments: a set|in this case Hand; an equivalence relation|in this case match rank; and a list of numbers|Profile. The predicate is true precisely when the list of numbers is a pro le of the partition de ned by the equivalence relation, where a pro le is a list of sizes of partition cells in non-increasing order. For example, if Hand is 9~, 6|, 9 , 6~, 6}], then Profile must be 3; 2]. The pro le 3; 2] is then associated with the class full house.
Building on this library of predicates for describing combinations, Gala also provides libraries with more speci c functionality that is common to a certain class of games. These include games played on a grid (such as chess or tic-tac-toe), playing cards, dice, and so on. For example, if a game is declared to include a grid-board object, a range of predicates that apply speci cally to a rectilinear board become available. One such predicate is straight-line, which tests for a sequence of squares in a straight line, all of which satisfy a certain property (such as an open le in chess or three-in-a-row in tic-tac-toe). It is de ned in terms of the chain predicate. In general, high-level predicates are typically very easy to de ne in terms of the intermediate level concepts, so that adding a module for a new class of games requires little e ort.
Advanced ow control
One of the primary advantages of representing a game as a Gala program is the ability to utilize the same code to encode structures that repeat again and again throughout the game. For example, as we discussed above, the rule for specifying the set of legal bets can be used in di erent subtrees of the poker game, as well as in di erent bets within the same subtree.
Gala provides a variety of repetition statements, the most basic of which is the while. It has the form while(Condition, '), and is interpreted by translation into an if statement. That is, if the current state is h(\while(Condition, '), "; V); F 1 ; : : :; F N i; then the following state would be:
h(\if(Condition, (', while(Condition, '))), "; V); F 1 ; : : :; F N i:
Gala also provides a repeat statement that is de ned in terms of while and provides fancier functionality. Its form is repeat(Flow, Condition 1 , :: :, Conditionn). Each Condition i can take one of two forms: unless(Predicate) or until(Predicate). The set of statements in Flow is executed repeatedly until one of the predicates becomes true; unless conditions are tested before an iteration, while until conditions are tested after an iteration.
Another feature adapted from traditional programming languages is the de ned game ow, which is analogous to a de ned procedure. As usual, it consists of a head and a body; the head consists of a name and a list of formal parameters, while the body is a game ow. A de ned game ow is listed as a separate section in the speci cation of a Gala program. For example, in our poker example, deal, bet, first bet and next bet are all de ned game ows.
A call to a de ned game ow is interpreted in the obvious way, with the parameters passed by value. If the game ow in a game state begins with a call to a de ned game ow, the values of the actual parameters are substituted for the formal parameters in the body of the de ned game ow, and this body is substituted for the call to the de ned game ow in the game state. All Prolog variables within the body of a de ned game ow are local, so di erent calls to the game ow do not cause binding con icts.
Finally, Gala provides functionality that allows for players to be treated uniformly. This allows for games where all the players (or a subgroup of players) take the same sequence of actions.
One such command is play round(Flow), where Flow is a game ow. In addition to executing Flow once for each player, this also de nes a special Gala variable \player" which takes as value each of the players in turn. Thus if Flow contains a step of the form choose($player,Action, Constraint), 8 each player will make a choice in turn. For example, in the poker program, play round(ante) has the ante ow called twice, with $player rst instantiated to dealer and then to gambler.
In addition to the player variable, the variable opponent is also de ned in a two player game, and lho and rho (for left-and right-hand opponent, respectively) are de ned in multiplayer games. There is also a variant of play round which allows a subset of the players to play the round, perhaps in a di erent order from the default order.
Gala also allows a temporally extended version of play round, in which the players take turns performing a sequence of actions until some condition is true. The statement takes the form take turns(Flow, Condition 1 , : : :, Conditionn). It is essentially the same as repeat(Flow, (Condition 1 , : : :, Conditionn), with the player variable and its relatives being de ned in the same way as for play round. 9 For example, in the poker program, the take turns construct is used to describe repeated betting by the players in turn. This terminates either when wins() is called within the next bet ow, or when someone meets, in which case $debt=0.
Two complete Gala programs
In this section, we describe how the various features of the Gala language are combined to form a Gala program. As an example, Figure 6 shows a complete listing of a simple inspection game, which has received signi cant attention in the game theory community as a model of on-site inspections for arms control treaties Avenhaus et al., 1995] .
The inspection game involves two players: a violator, who wants to commit some treaty-violating act (such as nuclear testing), and an inspector who wants to prevent the act. The game takes place over n stages. In each period, the violator chooses whether or not to violate, and the inspector chooses whether or not to inspect. Unfortunately, by the terms of the treaty the inspector may only inspect l times over the n stages, where l < n. If at any stage the violator violates without being caught, the violator wins. If the violator is caught, or if he does not attempt a violation throughout the game, the inspector wins. If at any point the number of remaining inspections is 0, we assume that the violator will succesfully violate at the next stage. If the number of inspections remaining equals the number of stages remaining, we assume the inspector will inspect in every subsequent stage, thereby ensuring victory. The game terminates as soon as either of these assumptions becomes valid, because the winner is then known.
A Gala program consists of a statement game(GameName, DeclarationList), together with a set of auxiliary Prolog predicates. Each declaration in DeclarationList has the form Name : Definition. Some declarations de ne game ows, while others specify other aspects of the game.
The players declaration lists the players in the game, in the order used by default for constructs such as play round and take turns. The variables declaration declares Gala variables used in the program. The params declaration illustrates a powerful feature of Gala. A Gala program can be parameterized, so that it de nes a family of games. The program shown de nes the inspection game for any number of stages and inspections. In this program, the parameter values are used only to declare the initial values of Gala variables. In general, the parameters can also appear directly inside a game ow, but they are not part of the game state, and cannot be modi ed during a game.
The flow declaration de nes the game ow for the entire game; it must appear in every game description. (It is analogous to the main function in a C program.) Two other game ows are also de ned in this program: stage and determine outcome. The content of every game ow is a sequence of statements, as de ned in the previous sections. In this case, the primary construct in the main ow is the repeat statement: stage is repeated until one of the termination conditions is met. When that happens, the outcome of the game is determined. The termination conditions are de ned in auxiliary Prolog predicates.
Each stage consists of a choice by both players. The violator chooses whether or not to violate, while the inspector chooses whether or not to inspect. After they make their choices, the inspector's decision is revealed to the violator, but the violator's decision is not revealed to the inspector. The remainder of the stage consists of bookkeeping, updating the values of the Gala variables violate, inspect, inspections remaining and stages remaining.
As a nal example, Figures 7 and 8 show the complete code for the poker game from Figure 2 . Approximately half the code is the Gala program, while the rest is Prolog code for evaluating and The only new feature is the objects declaration, which declares that the game includes a deck of cards, and a money account for the two players and the pot. This declaration allows the program to use Gala functionality created for these types of objects. For example, the deal statement causes cards to be removed from the deck and added to a player's hand. This Gala program takes ve parameters: the suits and ranks of cards in the deck, the number of cards dealt to each player, the amount of cash initially given to each player, and the amount of the ante. Not only does the program describe many di erent poker games through the use of parameters, it can easily be modi ed to describe other variants of poker, in which cards are dealt one at a time, exchanged with the deck, individually revealed, and so on. For example, describing a game in which each player exchanges cards can be done by adding a game ow describing the exchange process, and replacing the bet step in flow with (take turns(exchange), bet).
Gala programs and game trees
Above, we showed how we can specify any extensive form game as a Gala program. However, in order to apply standard solution algorithms to Gala-speci ed games, we need a process for converting a Gala program into a game tree. More precisely, given a Gala program and an assignment of values to the program parameters, we need to generate a game tree corresponding to the game.
To accomplish this task, we need to understand the relationship between an execution tree and a game tree. In some sense, an execution tree is an annotated game tree: just like in a game tree, each vertex in the execution tree corresponds to a state in the game. 10 However, the game tree contains nodes only for those states which represent a choice point in the game, one where di erent outcomes lead to di erent plays in the game. In contrast, an execution tree also contains vertices which correspond to deterministic manipulations of the gamestate, e.g., changing the values of variables, transforming a complex statement into simpler ones, etc. The states corresponding to these deterministic transformations would not be associated with nodes in the game tree.
Thus, the game tree is essentially a condensed version of the execution tree, where we eliminate all vertices that have only one successor. More precisely, the game tree has:
An internal node for every vertex in the execution tree where the rst command in the game ow is the placeholder choosing( ). A leaf node for every leaf vertex in the execution tree. An edge from one node to another, whenever there is a path consisting of deterministic edges between the corresponding vertices in the execution tree. The information sets for the game tree can be derived from the local states of the associated vertices in the execution tree. An information set for player k corresponds to some local state s k , and consists of all choice nodes for player k that correspond to execution-tree vertices where player k's local state is s k . Note that the information set is determined only by the local state of the player whose turn it is to move.
Strategies and equilibrium
While de ning a game and examining the possible scenarios is an interesting exercise, our goal is really to nd good strategies for playing the game. In this section, we survey the game-theoretic de nitions of a strategy, a minimax strategy, and a Nash equilibrium strategy. We describe these concepts in the framework of extensive form games.
The simplest of all strategies is a pure (deterministic) strategy. Like a conditional plan in AI, a pure strategy is a very explicit \how-to-play manual" that tells the player what to do at every 10 To help disambiguate, we use \state" or \vertex" for nodes in the execution tree, and \node" for nodes in the game tree. possible point in the game. In the poker example of Figure 5 , such a manual for the gambler would contain an entry: \If I hold a King, and I passed in the rst round, and the dealer bets, then bet 1." In general, a pure strategy k for player k speci es a choice at each of his or her information sets. (Since the player cannot distinguish between nodes in the same information set, the strategy cannot dictate di erent actions at those nodes.)
Fixing a strategy for each of the players does not completely determine the outcome of the game, since the game also contains moves representing nature. However, the behavior at these nodes, while random, is completely speci ed in the description of the game. Therefore, a tuple of strategies = ( 1 ; : : :; N ), where each k is a strategy for player k, determines a probability distribution over the leaves of the tree. We will denote the probability of reaching some node p in the tree by Pr (p).
De nition 4.1: The expected payo H( ) is de ned to be
Based on these de nitions, we can now describe what we mean by`solving' a game. A solution to a game is a recommendation to the various players of how to play the game, i.e., a tuple of strategies = ( 1 ; : : :; N ). Of course, not every tuple of strategies dictates behavior which is rational for the di erent players. At the very minimum, one would wish that each player's strategy be optimal with respect to the current context. That is, a player should not be able to do better by diverging from his strategy, provided the strategies of all other players remains constant. If a tuple of strategies satis es this property for all players, the strategies are said to be in equilibrium. The equilibrium property is a highly desirable one. Without it, a player following the \recom-mended solution" may leave himself vulnerable to having his strategy predicted (since following the recommendation is the rational thing to do) and possibly taken advantage of. In that case, following the recommended solution is no longer rational, making the whole idea of solution somewhat dubious.
The ability to announce one's strategy without giving the advantage to the other player is particularly important in the context of an arti cial agent. There, it is very di cult to keep one's strategy a secret. For one thing, it is always possible to break into the code. For another, it is often possible to subject the agent's program to intensive testing simply by playing the game over and over again.
In perfect information games, we can easily construct an equilibrium solution to the game via a process called backward induction: At the leaves of the tree, the payo s for all players are known. At a state which is just before the end of the game, the player whose turn it is will choose the action that maximizes his or her own payo s. Under the assumption that this player will act rationally, the player in the preceding node in the game tree can now determine the optimal action for him or her. This backward induction process reduces to the standard minimax algorithm (originally due to Zermelo 1913] ) in the case of zero-sum games.
Unfortunately, in most real-life games, the players do not have perfect information. It is clear that this simple process cannot work for imperfect information games. Here, the decision as to the optimal move must be done for the entire information set, rather than for individual nodes. And a strategy which is optimal in one node in the information set may not be optimal in others. For example, in our simple poker game, there are two nodes in the information set corresponding to the situation where the dealer's hand is a Queen and the gambler bet. In one of these two nodes, the gambler has a Jack, and in the other, a King. Clearly, di erent moves are optimal in these two nodes.
How do we nd an equilibrium in the far more complex case of imperfect information games? The answer is that we don't. In fact, as de ned, an equilibrium might not even exist. To see this, consider the simple game of \scissors-paper-stone." There, any pure strategy is a losing one as soon as it is revealed to the other player. That is, we cannot achieve equilibrium with any pure strategy.
The problem is not with the notion of equilibrium, but with the use of pure strategies. Pure strategies are predictable, and predictable play gives the opponent information. The opponent can nd a strategy calculated to take advantage of this information, thereby making the original strategy suboptimal. Unpredictable play, on the other hand, maintains the information gap inherent in imperfect information games. Unpredictability can only be guaranteed by using randomized strategies:
De nition 4.3: A randomized strategy k for player k (called a behavior strategy in game theory) is a function that, for each information set u of player k, returns a probability distribution over the choices C u at u.
In our poker example, a randomized strategy for the gambler can be described by de ning the probability of betting at each information set u c and u 0 c , c = 1; 2; 3.
Once we x a tuple of randomized strategies = ( 1 ; : : :; N ), the behavior (albeit random) is speci ed at all points in the game. Therefore, just as for pure strategies, determines a probability distribution Pr over the nodes in the game tree. Thus, De nition 4.1 can be used (only substituting for ) to ascribe an expected payo to a tuple of randomized strategies. Similarly, the notion of equilibrium presented in De nition 4.2 can be used, again substituting for .
The use of randomized strategies allows us to nd an adequate solution for the game of scissorspaper-stone. The strategy combination where each of the players assigns probability 1=3 to each of the three possible choices is clearly an equilibrium: Each player is guaranteed an expected payo of 0, and can do no better with any other strategy so long as the other player sticks to the equilibrium.
However, it is far from clear that an equilibrium necessarily exists in complex games involving many moves. In his Nobel-prize winning theorem, Nash 1951] showed that the use of randomized strategies allows us to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium for imperfect information games. 11 Theorem 4.4: Nash, 1951 ] Any extensive-form game with perfect recall has an equilibrium solution in randomized strategies.
Just as in the case of perfect information games, the equilibrium strategies are particularly compelling when the game is zero-sum. Then, as shown by von Neumann von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947] , any equilibrium strategy is optimal against a rational player. More precisely, the equilibrium pairs are those where each player plays the optimal defensive strategy: the one that provides the best worst-case payo . This maximin behavior is reasonable for zero-sum games since it is, in fact, in the other player's best interests to be as harmful as possible. More formally: Theorem 4.5: von Neumann, 1947] In a zero-sum game, a strategy pair 1 ; 2 is in equilibrium i 1 maximizes max 1 min 2 H 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) and 2 maximizes max 2 min 1 H 2 ( 1 ; 2 ), 12 where the maximization and minimization is over the space of randomized strategies.
Thus, in zero-sum games, the best defensive strategies are optimal in a very strong sense: They are the best that can be achieved against a rational player, i.e., a player that also plays the defensive strategy. Furthermore, a player can publicly announce her intention to do so without adversely a ecting her payo s.
Solving games
Now that we have a clearly de ned notion of a solution, how do we go about nding one? This is, in general, a very di cult problem. In the poker example of Figure 5 , we would specify a strategy for each of the players using six numbers: the move probabilities at the various information sets (six information sets per player). When trying to solve a game, we need to nd an appropriate set of numbers that satis es the properties we want. That is, we want to treat the parameters of the strategy as variables, and solve for them. In the zero-sum case, for example, the general computational problem is: Find x which achieves: max x min y H 1 (x; y) subject to x represents a strategy for player 1 (?) y represents a strategy for player 2 Given our de nition of randomized strategies, the appropriate set of variables seems to be obvious: We simply use the di erent move probabilities in the game. In the poker example, we would representing the dealer's strategy. Unfortunately, the space of legal assignments to these variables is a di cult one over which to search. It is continuous and high-dimensional. Furthermore, the payo function H, which plays an important role in both the de nition of equilibrium and the de nition of maxmin strategy, is not à nice' linear function of the x's and y's.
We now survey the two main frameworks for solving games in extensive form. In Section 5.1 we survey the traditional normal form algorithms, and in Section 5.2 we review the more recent approach of Koller et al., 1994] .
Normal form
The representation of a game in extensive form is rather complex, requiring many di erent components (nodes, edges, information sets, chance moves, . . . ) for representing the dynamics of the game and of the players' information state. By contrast, the goal of game theory is to provide a simple uniform framework for representing games, that will enable a mathematical analysis of their properties. The complexity of the extensive form was viewed as detracting from its suitability as a primary representation, inducing game theorists to develop an alternative formulation of a game, called the normal form (also known as the strategic form). It turns out that the normal form also allows for clean and elegant solution algorithms, adding to its attraction.
The normal form abstracts away much of the structure of the game. It represents the game only via the list of pure strategies available to the players. More precisely, the normal form is a table, indexed by a tuple of pure strategies = ( 1 ; : : :; N ), one for every player. For each such tuple, it lists the tuple of payo s H( ) = (H 1 ( ); : : :; H N ( )).
Clearly, every extensive-form game can be converted into the normal form. We simply list all of the possible pure-strategy combinations , and compute the (expected) payo tuple H( ). While this tranformation loses most of the information encoded in the game tree, it does capture the basic components necessary for equilibrium analysis (De nition 4.2): the possible courses of actions and their outcomes.
In the case of general two-player games, also called bimatrix games, the normal form can be written as a pair of m n matrices A and B. A row represents a pure strategy 1 of player 1, a column represents a simultaneously chosen pure strategy 2 of player 2, and the corresponding entries in A and B are H 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) and H 2 ( 1 ; 2 ), respectively. In zero-sum games, B = ?A, so the normal form of the game is completely speci ed by A. The matrix entry for each strategy pair represents the expected payo for this pair. In this case, it is simply the average of the six possible outcomes of the game arising from the six possible deals.
For example, on a (Q; J) deal, the gambler would bet, and then the dealer would pass, leading to a payo of 1. On a (K; Q) deal, the gambler would pass, and then the dealer would bet, giving the gambler the opportunity to bet after all, with an ensuing payo of 2.
As we mentioned above, the simpler representation of a game also allows for simple solution algorithms. Recall that the main di culty with solving games in the extensive form was the complexity of representing a randomized strategy. However, once we list all of a player's pure strategies, a randomized strategy can be viewed simply as a probability distribution over this set. Such a distribution is known as a mixed strategy in the game theory literature. Clearly, any randomized strategy generates such a distribution. For games of perfect recall, it is also the case that any such distribution (mixed strategy) is equivalent to a randomized strategy Kuhn, 1953] .
This representation of strategies allows us to construct a simple formulation of the problem of nding equilibrium strategies. The advantages are most tangible in the case of two-player games, so we will focus on those for the remainder of the section. However, much of the analysis holds unchanged in the general case.
Suppose player 1 has m pure strategies and player 2 has n pure strategies. Consider some We can represent this distribution as a vector x, with m components representing the probabilities 1 ( i 1 ) assigned by 1 to the pure strategies i 1 of player 1. In fact, any nonnegative m-vector x = (x 1 ; : : :; x m ) with P m i=1 x i = 1 describes a mixed strategy. Similarly, a mixed strategy 2 for player 2 can be represented by an n-vector y. It is easy to see that the expected payo H 1 ( 1 ; 2 ) is equal to the matrix product x T Ay, and similarly H 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) = x T By.
The vectors x;y provide us with an alternative set of variables for which we can solve. They allow us to reduce the problem of nding equilibrium strategies in two-player games to a simple problem of optimization over a linear space of vectors. For the zero-sum case, the problem (?) described above can be written as:
Find x which achieves: max x min y x T Ay subject to P m i=1 x i = 1 P n j=1 y j = 1
x;y 0:
This problem can be reformulated, by an appropriate use of linear programming duality Dantzig, 1963] , as a simple linear programming problem, resulting in the following theorem von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947 ]:
Theorem 5.1: von Neumann, 1947] The normal form of a zero-sum game de nes a linear program (LP) whose solutions are the equilibria (maximin strategies) of the game.
The standard Simplex algorithm for linear programming can be used to solve this LP very e ectively.
Other standard LP solution algorithms, while slower in practice, can be used to guarantee a worstcase polynomial time for the solution.
A di erent, but related, transformation allows the reformulation of the equilibrium problem for general two-player games as a linear complementarity problem (see Cottle et al., 1992] for a de nition):
Theorem 5.2: The normal form of a general two-player game de nes a linear complementarity problem (LCP) whose solutions are the equilibria of the game. One of the solutions to this LCP (each of which corresponds to an equilibrium) can be found by the Lemke-Howson algorithm Lemke and Howson, 1964] . This algorithm resembles the simplex algorithm both in its general operation and in the fact that, while requiring exponential time in the worst case, it is fast in practice. If a comprehensive list of equilibria is required, a general exhaustive enumeration scheme can be used (as in Cottle et al., 1992, p.17] ). This, of course, requires exponential time.
At this point, one might think that the problem of solving games is essentially solved, at least in the two-player case. In the zero-sum case, we have a fairly e cient polynomial-time algorithm. 13 In the general case, the problem of nding a single equilibrium is not known to be solvable in worst-case polynomial time. We do, however, have an algorithm which is e ective in practice.
However, a closer examination shows that Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 are highly misleading. Although useful, the normal form is not a representation which naturally captures a person's intuititive model of a game. In practice, a game-theoretic analyst would model the situation using some alternative 13 In fact, we really cannot expect to do better for a normal form game. It is easy to show that the converse to Theorem 5.1 also holds, i.e., the problem of solving a linear program can be reduced to that of solving a normal form game. 
Figure 10: A simple game where player 1 has`information sets and 2`pure strategies.
formalism, probably a game tree, and then convert to the normal form for the purposes of nding the solution. In both theorems, the size of the problem to be solved|the linear program or linear complementarity problem|is the size of the resulting normal form. And, unfortunately, the normal form of an extensive form game can be very large.
To understand this, consider the simple game tree in Figure 10 . In this game, player 1 has information sets, one for each possible move of player 2 at the initial state. At each of these information sets, the player has to pick one of the two possible moves. Thus, a pure strategy can be described as an`-length vector of R's and L's. The total number of possible pure strategies is therefore 2`. The normal form of this game contains a row for each and every one of these pure strategies. Therefore, the size of the normal form corresponding to this game is exponential in the size of the game tree! More generally, our strategy space is the set of functions from information sets to moves, and is therefore also exponential in the number of information sets. 14 Thus, in the worst-case, the process of solving the game via the algorithms in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 incurs an exponential blowup, not only in time, but also in space (which, in practice, is much worse). Clearly, this problem renders these algorithms impractical in the worst case.
One might think that this blowup does not arise in practice, but only in arti cial games like the one above. So, while the worst case is bad, perhaps the typical case is quite reasonable. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Consider our simple poker example, generalized to a deck with k cards. For each card c, player 1 must decide whether to pass or bet, and if he has the option, whether to pass or bet in the third round. There are three courses of action for each c, so the total number of possible strategies is 3 k . Player 2, on the other hand, must decide on her action for each card d and each of the two actions possible for the rst player in the rst round. The number of di erent decisions is therefore 2k, so the total number of deterministic strategies is 2 2k = 4 k . Since the normal form has a row for each strategy of one player and a column for each strategy of the other, it is also exponential in k, while the size of the game tree is only 9k + 1.
In fact, this blowup occurs in many real-life games, and appears to have been a signi cant obstacle to the widespread use of game theory as an analysis technique:
This astronomical increase in the number of variables to be determined actually occurs in some important real-world problems and often forces the analyst to abandon the game theoretic approach. An Overview of the Mathematical Theory of Games William F. Lucas, Cornell University 14 This analysis uses the standard conversion of an extensive form game into the normal form. Alternative conversions into a reduced normal form also exist. While the reduced normal form is smaller than the normal form, it is still exponential in the size of the game tree. See von Stengel, 1996] for details.
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Sequence form
The exponential blowup associated with the normal form makes the standard solution algorithms an unrealistic option for many games. Recently, however, a new approach to solving imperfect information games was developed by Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel 1994] . This approach uses an alternative representation called the sequence form, which avoids the exponential blowup associated with the normal form. 15 We will describe the main ideas brie y here; for more details see Koller et al., 1994; von Stengel, 1996; Koller et al., 1996] .
The sequence form is based on a di erent representation of the strategic variables. Rather than representing probabilities of individual moves (as in the extensive form), or probabilities of full pure strategies (as in the normal form), the variables represent the realization weight of di erent sequences of moves.
Essentially, a sequence for a player corresponds to a path down the tree, but it isolates the moves under that player's direct control, ignoring chance moves and the decisions of the other players. In our poker game of Figure 5 , for example, the gambler has 13 sequences: in addition to the empty sequence (which corresponds to the root of the game) he has four sequences for each card c: bet on c] (in which case there is no third round), pass on c], pass on c, bet in the last round], and pass on c, pass in the last round]. The dealer also has 13 sequences: the empty sequence, and for each card d, the four sequences bet on d after seeing a pass], pass on d after seeing a pass], bet on d after seeing a bet], pass on d after seeing a bet].
More precisely, let k be a player, and let p be a node of the game tree. There is a unique path from the root to p. On this path, certain edges correspond to moves of player k. The string of labels of these edges is denoted by k (p) and is called the sequence of choices of player k leading to p. It may be the empty sequence ;, for example if p is the root. Essentially, the sequence k (p) describes the choices that player k has to make so that p can be reached in the game. I.e., a pure strategy k can only reach p if it chooses to make every move in k (p) at the information set when the move is relevant.
Our goal is to describe a randomized strategy via some set of weights associated with sequences. (Just as, for mixed strategies, we described a randomized strategy via a set of weights associated with pure strategies.) We therefore consider the probability that, for a given randomized strategy k , a certain sequence is realized in play. Clearly, a player cannot unilaterally determine whether a sequence is realized. For example, the sequence pass on c, bet in the last round] can only be realized if the dealer decides to bet in her turn. However, the player's strategy does determine whether a sequence is realized given that the appropriate decision points in the game are reached. Thus, for a given randomized strategy k , we de ne the realization weight of a sequence k (some sequence for player k) as a conditional probability:
De nition 5.3: The realization weight of a sequence k under k , denoted k ( k ), is de ned to be the probability that player k, playing according to k , will take the moves in k , given that the corresponding information sets are reached in the game. The set of realization weights k ( 1 k ); : : :; k ( m k k ), where 1 k ; : : :; m k k is the set of sequences of player k, is called a realization plan for player k.
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In 1996, it was discovered that the sequence form was rst suggested by Romanovsky 1962] . But Romanovsky's paper was published only in Russian and so his result was completely unknown to the scienti c community in the West. This led to the later but independent development of the sequence form by Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel. It is fairly easy to see that the realization weight k ( k ) is simply the product of the probabilities, according to k , of the moves listed in k .
We can nd equilibrium strategies for player k by searching over the space of possible realization plans. More precisely, as described at the beginning of this section, we treat the realization weights of player k as variables x 1 k ; : : :; x m k k , and search over the space of possible assignments to these variables for one that satis es our optimality conditions (e.g., minimax). Note that there is at most one sequence, and therefore one variable, for each node in the game tree. Compare this to the exponential number of variables required to represent a strategy in the normal form.
Several crucial properties are required in order to make this process feasible. First, in order to substitute a search over realization plans for a search over randomized strategies, we must provide a correspondence between the two spaces. Clearly, not every vector of numbers (of the right length) actually represents some randomized strategy.
Lemma 5.4: Koller and Megiddo, 1992] If player k has perfect recall, then there exists a matrix E and a vector e such that a non-negative vector x of dimension m k represents a randomized strategy for player k if and only if Ex = e. Furthermore, the matrix E and vector e can be derived from the game tree in linear time.
That is, for a vector to represent a randomized strategy, it must satisfy certain constraints.
These constraints (as encoded in the matrix E and the vector e) are quite simple: They force the weights to \add up" the right way. More generally, let k be the sequence for player k leading to an information set at which player k is to move, 16 and let c 1 ; : : :; c`be the possible moves at that information set. The sequence k is realized if and only if one of its continuations is realized, and these are mutually exclusive events.
Therefore, we must have that x k = x k c 1 + +x k c`, where k c is the sequence obtained from concatenating the move c to the sequence k . The only other constraints are that the realization weight of the empty sequence is 1 (because the root of the game is realized in any play of the game), and that x 0 for all .
Thus, a realization plan for the gambler is a 13-element vector x satisfying the constraints in Figure 11 (a). The constraints are written under the assumption that the sequences are ordered 16 The perfect recall assumption implies that there is at most one sequence k leading to this information set. as in Figure 12 . Thus, the constraints asserting that the weights of p c ; p 0 c ] and p c ; b 0 c ] sum up to the weight of p c ] (for each of the three di erent values of c) are encoded in lines 3, 5, and 7 of the matrix. Similarly, a realization plan for the dealer is a 13-element vector y satisfying the constraints in Figure 11(b) .
The sequence form transformation allows us to accomplish the task of searching over the space of randomized strategies, by searching over the space of vectors satisfying the constraints. Furthermore, once an appropriate vector is found, we can easily recover the corresponding randomized strategy. That is, if a realization plan satis es the condition of Lemma 5.4, then we can recover the corresponding randomized strategy k from the realization weights. Let c be a possible move at some node p in the game tree where player k is to move, and let k be the sequence of player-k moves leading to p. The analysis above shows that we can represent a randomized strategy as a realization plan, and easily convert between the two representations. However, it is still not clear what advantages we have gained from doing so. The key point is that we describe the payo function H as a linear function of the realization plan variables; this linearity was the key to the normal-form solution algorithms.
To derive this linearity property, we must divide each path in the game tree into its components. The probability that a path is actually taken in a game is the product of the probability of all of the moves on the path. This product can be re-expressed as the product of the realization weights of all the players' sequences on that path, times the probability of all the chance moves on the path. That is, for a given tuple ( 1 ; : : :; N ) of randomized strategies,
where (p) denotes the product of the chance probabilities on the path to p. Incorporating this expression into De nition 4.1, we obtain that:
(1) If x is a realization plan for player k corresponding to the strategy k , then k ( k ) is precisely x k , so that H( ) is, indeed, linear in the realization weight variables for each of the players.
In the two player case, the linearity of Equation (1) allows us to achieve a matrix formulation analogous to the one we used for the normal form. In this representation, called the sequence form, we again de ne a matrix A (or a pair of matrices A;B). But here, the rows correspond to the sequences (rather than pure strategies) of player 1, and the columns correspond to the sequences of player 2. The entry a ij is the weighted sum of the payo at the leaves that are reached by the pair of sequences i 1 and j 2 , i.e., of sequences). Note that if a pair of sequences is not consistent with any path to a leaf, the matrix entry is zero. Thus, the matrix entry for the pair bet on a Queen] and pass on a Jack after seeing a pass] is 0. Figure 12 shows the matrix for the sequence form for the simpli ed poker game. Let x denote a realization plan for player 1, and y denote a realization plan for player 2. The entry x i of x is the weight of the sequence i 1 at the ith row of A, i.e., x i = 1 ( i 1 ), where 1 is the randomized strategy corresponding to x (assuming one exists). Similarly, y j = 2 ( j 2 ). It now easily follows from the de nitions of a ij , x i , and y j , and from Equation (1) that H 1 (x; y) = x T Ay;
precisely as for the normal form. We can now solve (?) using realization weights as our strategic variables. The similarity between the normal form and sequence form formulations of (?) allow the use of very similar techniques to those used in the proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2, resulting in the following theorems:
Theorem 5.5: Koller et al., 1994] The sequence form of a zero-sum game de nes a linear program (LP) whose solutions are the equilibria (maximin strategies) of the game. As before, standard LP solution algorithms provide us with polynomial time algorithms for solving such games.
In the more general case:
Theorem 5.6: Koller et al., 1994] The sequence form of a general two-player game de nes a linear complementarity problem (LCP) whose solutions are the equilibria of the game. One of these solutions (each of which corresponds to an equilibrium) can be found by Lemke's algorithm Lemke, 1965 ].
Lemke's algorithm is a simple variant of the Lemke-Howson algorithm, with the same general characteristics. At rst glance, these results seem very similar to the normal-form results, so it might not be clear what we have gained. The key is that the sequence form (and the representation of a realization plan) is at most linear in the size of the game tree, since there is at most one sequence for each node in the game tree, and one constraint for each information set. Furthermore, it can be generated very easily by a single pass over the game tree. Thus, for example, the LP algorithm for zero-sum games is polynomial in the size of the game tree as opposed to polynomial in the size of the normal form. (The algorithms for the general case are analogous, except that the worst-case behavior is exponential in the size of the corresponding representation.) Since the normal form is typically exponential in the size of the game tree, these results provide an exponential time reduction over the standard normal-form algorithms! 6 The Gala system
The Gala system builds on the techniques described in the previous sections to provide a complete system for specifying and solving games. The system, described in Figure 13 , uses three main stages for processing a game: generating a game tree from a Gala speci cation, solving the game tree, and examining the strategies. The system as a whole provides end-to-end functionality, from the game speci cation to the examination of the optimal strategies. The result is a very useful package for experimental gametheoretic analysis. To illustrate this process, consider the game of poker. As demonstrated in Section 3.5, the speci cation of the general game is compact and natural. Appropriate instantiations of the parameters of the program allow the generation of a variety of games. These games can be e ectively solved, and the strategy interpreted. We illustrate this below.
Game tree generation
In the rst stage, the system receives as input a game speci ed in the Gala language (as described in Section 3). The system interprets the Gala code, running through the various possible executions of the game. The interpreter works by maintaining the game state, including the local state of the agents, and updating it according to the Gala semantics (Section 3). When the interpreter reaches a choice point, it explores all of the possible outcomes, in a depth-rst fashion.
The interpreter is implemented in Prolog, relying on the underlying Prolog interpreter for interpreting the embedded Prolog predicates in the Gala code. It also utilizes the ability of Prolog to deal with nondeterminism to facilitate the generation of the di erent possible plays of the game.
As a result, the interpreter searches the entire execution tree of the program. During the generation of the execution tree, the corresponding game tree, as de ned in Section 3.6, is generated. Whenever a choose statement is encountered, a node in the game tree is created. The node is added to the appropriate information set: the information set consisting of all nodes where the player's local state is the same (according to Prolog structural equality).
Solving the game
In the second stage of processing, the system solves the resulting extensive-form game. Currently, this occurs via one of two methods. The rst is using the sequence form. The Gala system converts the game tree to its sequence form, and outputs the resulting matrices. These can be read by the appropriate solution algorithm. The current implementation of the system supports only the solution of zero-sum games, by using commercial linear programming software packages 17 over the resulting sequence form. We are currently working on the implementation of the case of general two-player games. The Gala system is the rst to provide an implementation of any of the sequence form algorithms.
The other solution method is via an interface to the gambit system McKelvey, 1992] , a stateof-the-art game theory software package which provides a number of game-theoretic solution algorithms (primarily for the normal form). Gala outputs the extensive form of a game in a format readable by gambit, and calls the appropriate gambit routines over the result. In particular, gambit provides algorithms for multi-player games, so that such games written in the Gala language can be solved using the two systems in combination. The Gala system, via its interface to gambit, allows us to compare the performance of the sequence form and the normal form algorithms on practical problems. We experimented with two games: simpli ed poker, instantiated from the Gala program in Figures 7 and 8 , and inspection game, instantiated from the program of Figure 6 .
The experiments were performed as follows: The Gala system was used to generate di erent variants of these games, induced by di erent instantiations to the parameters. We generated poker 17 CPLEX, Matlab and OSL are all supported. games with di erent numbers of cards in the deck, and inspection games with a varying number of stages and inspections. For the sequence form experiments, the extensive form was transformed to the sequence form by the Gala solution engine and the resulting linear program was solved using CPLEX. The times for the conversion to sequence form and the solution of the linear program were added together.
For the normal form experiments, the game trees were printed to a le and converted to normal form by the gambit system. The normal form linear program was again solved using CPLEX. The times for the conversion to normal form and the solution of the linear program were added together. In more recent experiments, we have solved poker games with over 140,000 nodes (see below). The largest games we have solved take about an hour on a Sun UltraSPARC II.
We believe that the Gala system can easily be modi ed to deal with much larger games, simply by streamlining the implementation. Figure 15 also shows the division of time between generating the sequence form and solving the resulting linear program. For the poker games, we can see that generating the sequence form takes the bulk of the time. Solving even the largest of these games takes less than 10 seconds. Thus, we believe that the system can be made to run considerably faster by optimizing the sequence-form generator. Furthermore, the current implementation of this generator stores the game tree in main memory as it is generated. As a consequence, the amount of main memory available posed the most severe constraint on the size of our experiments. A more careful implementation would write the game tree to disk as it is created, and then generate the sequence form from it (a process which can be done in a single pass over the tree). We believe that these minor modi cations will allow the system to e ciently deal with much larger games.
In general, the main in uences on the complexity of solving a sequence form game are the number of nodes in the tree and the structure of the information sets. In poker, for example, the total size of the tree is determined by the initial number of deals and the number of nodes in the subtree for each deal, which in turn depends on cash-ante. Figure 16 shows the number of cards in the deck, the number of cards dealt to each player, and the number of rounds for the largest games solved so far. The most extreme points are 127 card deck, 1 card each, 1 round; 3 card deck, 1 card each, 11 rounds; and 11 card deck, 5 cards each, 3 rounds. The in uence of the information-set structure is apparent when we compare the performance of the sequence-form algorithm for poker games and for inspection games. Games such as poker, which are wide and shallow, tend to have many parallel information sets (information sets which cannot be reached in the same play of a game); they typically gain the most from the use of the sequence form. In the inspection game, on the other hand, the tree tends to be deep and narrow, reducing the computational savings obtained from the sequence-form representation.
Examining the strategies
The nal stage of processing allows the user to examine the optimal strategies discovered by the solution engine. The user can navigate the game tree and view the optimal behavior strategy at any information set. The gambit interface is also useful, since gambit o ers a nice graphical user interface for displaying game trees and the resulting strategies.
The Gala system also provides other useful information about the equilibrium solution. Once a pair of strategies is xed, every branch in the game tree has a value, which is the expected outcome of the game given that the branch is taken and from that point the players continue to play according to the speci ed strategies. Also, the strategies induce a probability distribution over the plays of the game. Therefore, at any of her information sets, the player can derive a belief state|the resulting probability distribution over the nodes in the information set. Gala allows the user to examine the value of any action and the belief state of a player.
Figures 17 and 18 present the strategies resulting from this analysis for an eight-card version of the simpli ed poker discussed throughout the game. (We have an eight-card deck, each player is dealt one card, has an ante of $1, and another dollar with which to bet.) 18 They provide an interesting example of the insights that can be achieved by such an analysis. Consider the probability that the gambler bets in the rst round: it is very high on a 1, 0 on the middle cards, and then goes up for the high cards. The behavior for the low cards corresponds to blu ng, a characteristic that one tends to associate with the psychological makeup of human players. Similarly, after seeing a pass in the rst round, the dealer bets on low cards with very high probability. Psychologically, we interpret this as an attempt to discourage the gambler from`changing his mind' and betting in the nal round. In more complex games, we see other examples where \human" behavior (e.g., underbidding) is game-theoretically optimal.
The fact that such`psychological' properties are game-theoretically optimal in poker was rst pointed out by Kuhn 1950] . It was a result of a laborious manual analysis for the 3-card poker game described above. The Gala system makes this type of analysis an e ortless process, and allows it to be carried out for much more complex games.
As this example illustrates, the system also provides the exact probabilities for the various actions (e.g., blu ng on a low hand). Thus, the output of the system can be implemented directly. Before, only very simple games could be solved exactly. Thus, the outcome of a game-theoretic 18 The game was generated and solved in under 2 seconds using the Gala system. The corresponding normal form algorithm did not terminate after two days of execution. solution process was a strategy for a greatly simpli ed game, preventing the results from being directly applicable.
Discussion
Equilibrium and optimality
Throughout the paper, we have not questioned the use of Nash equilibrium as the de nition of the desired solution. In practice, however, the Nash equilibrium is not always appropriate, particularly in the case of extensive-form games. The problem arises even in the (relatively very simple) case of zero-sum games. The de nition of a maximin strategy (as set out in Theorem 4.5) only requires that the strategy 1 be optimal in the worst case, i.e., when player 2 is playing optimally. This situation is unlikely to materialize when human players are involved: human players invariably make mistakes.
The maximin criterion results in strategies that are guaranteed to do no worse against a suboptimal adversary than against an optimal one. But the strategies are not guaranteed to take advantages of mistakes when they become apparent. This can lead to very counterintuitive behavior. For example, assume that player 1 is guaranteed to win $1 against an optimal player 2. But now, the latter makes a mistake which allows player 1 to immediately win $10000. It is perfectly consistent with the de nition for the`optimal' (maximin) strategy to continue playing so as to win the $1 that was the original goal.
It is interesting to compare this behavior and the one resulting from an optimal strategy for a perfect information game. In the perfect information case, the maximin de nition also allows for strategies with the same bizarre behavior. However, the speci c backward induction algorithm used to solve the game avoids such strategies by picking, at each node, the move which is optimal at that node. Unfortunately, in the case of imperfect information games, it is much harder to de ne a notion of \optimal from this point on" (see Section 7.2 for some discussion). Essentially, the player might not know which node the game is actually at, and designing strategies that are optimal from an information set is much more complicated.
These di culties are well-known, and have led to the development of an extensive suite of alternative (more re ned) solution concepts. The discussion of the di erent options is beyond the scope of this paper; see van Damme, 1983 ] for a survey. Currently, there seems to be no consensus as to the \right solution" to this problem. Nevertheless, it would be useful to incorporate one or more of the alternative solutions into the Gala system. Work is in progress on the computational aspects of these more re ned solution concepts. See McKelvey and McLennan, 1996; van den Elzen et al., 1996] for some results. 19 There is an alternative approach to the problem of dealing with less-than-perfect players. Rather than simply reacting to suboptimality when it is detected, we can try to learn the type of mistake that a certain player is prone to make. This approach can be used when there is a long-term interaction with the same player (or with players sharing similar aws in play), either within a single (long) game or over a series of games. The ability of the Gala language to capture regularities in the game may be particularly useful in this context, since the high-level description of a game state can provide features for the learning algorithm.
Scaling up
While we can now solve games with tens of thousands of nodes, we are nowhere close to being able to solve huge games such as full-scale poker, and it is unlikely that we will ever be able to do so. A game tree for ve-card draw poker, for example, where players are allowed to exchange cards, has over 10 25 di erent nodes. The situation (for zero-sum games) is now quite similar to that of perfect-information games: We have algorithms that are fairly e cient in the size of the game tree; unfortunately, the game tree is often extremely large.
Nevertheless, chess-playing programs are very successful in spite of the fact that we currently cannot solve full-scale chess. Can the standard game-playing techniques be applied to imperfect information games? We believe that, in principle, the answer is yes, but the issue is nontrivial.
The standard algorithms for playing perfect-information games have the following general form: 1. Expand an initial subtree of the game, beginning at the root node, and using a heuristic evaluation function to assign a payo to the leaves of the subtree. 2. Compute optimal pure strategies in the resulting subtree. 20 3. Choose the action at the root that is optimal in the subtree, and wait for the opponent to choose an action. 4. Return to step 1, using the node reached as a consequence of the actions as the new root. Can we adapt this approach to solving imperfect-information games? Initially, everything seems to work out ne. Just as before, we expand an initial subtree of the game, beginning at the root node, and use a heuristic evaluation function to assign a payo to the leaves of the subtree. We solve the resulting tree to obtain randomized strategies for each player. We now have a strategy for the initial stages of the game, so play can proceed.
The problem arises when we attempt to apply this idea to subsequent positions in the game. At that point, the player might not know what node she is actually in. That is, the actual node might be p, while the player knows only that she is in the information set u which contains p. The player must therefore consider and somehow combine the subtrees rooted at each of the nodes in u, to obtain a single decision for the entire information set.
Of course, the player also has beliefs over the nodes in the information set, as determined by the strategies computed before and the probabilities of the chance moves. Therefore, one might think that the problem can be solved by a simple process of reasoning by cases. We consider each of the nodes in the information set separately, generating a game tree representing the assumption that this is the true state of the world. We nd an optimal move in each tree. Finally, we choose a randomized strategy, in which each move is weighted by the probability that the true state is one for which it is optimal. This approach is clearly awed: it assumes that the player has perfect information when making her decision. Consider, for example, a variant of the inspection game where, in each round, the inspector also has the possibility of gathering intelligence before inspecting. This action has a cost, but does not waste an entire inspection. It might well be the optimal course of action. However, it will never be chosen by the algorithm described above. The algorithm considers two options: Either a violation has occurred, in which case one should simply inspect; or, a violation has not occurred, in which case the intelligence gather is a waste of resources.
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The solution process is often interleaved with the process of generating the game tree, so that partial results can be used to guide the expansion process to more relevant parts of the game tree.
A somewhat more plausible approach incorporates the player's uncertainty about the current position: The player creates a new game tree, in which the root node is a chance node, and its children are all the nodes in u. The chance move represents the player's uncertainty, so that the probability of the chance move leading to each node agrees with the player's belief state. The analysis now proceeds with the new tree.
The aw in this algorithm is more subtle. While it does incorporate the player's uncertainty, it ignores the opponent's uncertainty. After all, even if the player knows that the true state is one of the nodes in u, the opponent does not necessarily have the same information. Consider the second round in three-card poker when the dealer is trying to decide on her action following a pass by the gambler. The dealer knows her own hand, a Jack. The two nodes in her information set correspond to those where the gambler has a Queen and a King. In any game that begins by choosing one of these two nodes at random, the gambler will always have a better card than the dealer, and know it, so the dealer has no reason to blu . However, in the actual game, if the gambler has a Queen he will not know that he has the better card. And, in fact, the optimal strategy requires that the dealer blu with non-zero probability, to take advantage of this situation.
The point is that the opponent's information state can have a large e ect on one's strategy. Thus, one cannot eliminate nodes that the opponent considers possible, even if one knows for a fact that they are not. Similarly, nodes that neither player considers possible, but that one player thinks the other player considers possible, can also have an e ect on a player's strategy. The only nodes that can be completely eliminated from consideration are those for which it is common knowledge Fagin et al., 1995] that they cannot be reached. 21 It might be possible to develop a solution approach, analogous to the one described above, where we only eliminate such nodes. The resulting algorithm may be useful in some games. For example, in a poker game which consists of a deal followed by many rounds of betting, the number of reachable nodes stays constant, since all bets are common knowledge. 22 Unfortunately, many games have a more complex information structure, in which knowledge is dynamically created and revealed. This is the case with the inspection game and with variants of poker in which cards are dealt during the course of the game. In such games, the elimination of unreachable nodes may not signi cantly reduce the size of the game tree. Some other method of pruning the tree is needed, perhaps one based on the value of information metric (see, e.g., Howard et al., 1977] ). We believe that developing an algorithm that prunes the tree in a principled manner presents an interesting research problem.
Besides the di culties involved in pruning the tree, care must also be taken in designing the heuristic evaluation function used to evaluate nodes at the leaves of the subtree. This function must take into account the knowledge of the players in a state. In other words, the evaluation of a node must consider not only the node itself, but other nodes in the same information set. (In fact, the information state of all the players may conceivably a ect the node's value.) For example, a naive evaluation function for poker might estimate that the player with the better hand will win the current stake, but this fails to di erentiate between the states where a player knows she has the better hand and one where she does not, and this knowledge a ects the value of the state. In three-card poker, if your opponent possesses a Jack, the state in which you possess a King is better than the one in which you possess a Queen, because you cannot be fooled by a blu .
Even if we were to circumvent all of these obstacles, the bounded-depth-search approach is not a general solution. While it may work when the game tree is deep but not too wide, some game 21 A fact ' is common knowledge if both players know ', both players know that they both know ', they know that they know that they know ', and so on. trees (full scale poker, for example) cannot even be expanded to depth 1. One approach that may be useful for such games (as well as for others) is based on abstraction. Many similar game states are mapped to the same abstract state, resulting in an abstract game tree much smaller than the original tree. The abstract tree can then be solved completely, and the strategies for the abstract game can be used to play the real game.
In poker, for example, this approach is likely to work very well. It is implausible that each of the ? 52 5 hands that a player can get (in 5-card draw) generates a completely di erent strategy.
Indeed, our experimental results in Section 6 reveal a lot of regularity in the strategies, with the gambler exhibiting identical behavior for the cards 6, 7 and 8. We believe that the solution for an appropriately abstracted game will result in strategies that are very close to optimal. We are currently in the process of experimenting with various possible abstractions.
Gala's ability to concisely and naturally represent a game via its rules may even allow us to construct appropriate abstractions automatically. Even more interestingly, it raises the intriguing possibility that we might, one day, develop solution algorithms that solve games directly from their rules.
Conclusion
The Gala system can provide the infrastructure for experimental game-theoretic research. Di erent abstractions and variants of a game can be generated easily and solved e ciently. Gala therefore provides a convenient tool for testing and evaluating di erent approaches for solving games.
Perhaps more importantly, Gala can play a crucial role in making game-theoretic reasoning more accessible to people and computer systems. The system allows complex games to be described simply, in a language even a layperson (one who is not a game-theory expert) can use. This allows the game to be re ned until it adequately models the given situation. The e ective solution algorithms implemented in the system allow solutions to be obtained in a reasonable amount of time. Finally, the solutions can be examined and interpreted in a way that is legible for a non-expert human. We hope that the public availability of Gala (available from http://robotics.stanford.edu/~koller/gala.html) will encourage the use of game-theoretic reasoning in day-to-day life.
